The First Encounter: Fighting for Naval Supremacy on Lake Ontario, 7–10 August 1813 by Williamson, Robert James
The First Encounter
Fighting for Naval Supremacy on 
Lake Ontario, 7-10 August 1813
Robert Janies Williamson
Introduction
At the outbreak of the War of 1812, the United S ta tes w as woefully ill p repared  to fight in 
the  G reat Lakes Basin. However, th a t  is w here 
m ost of the  w arfare w ould take place. In th a t 
relatively inaccessib le p a r t  of the world where 
few roads existed, bo th  sides in  th is  conflict 
knew  th a t  control of the w ater tran sp o rta tio n  
system  was the key to m ilitary success. Despite 
that, the Am ericans would s ta r t the w ar on Lake 
O ntario with only one ship, a 16-gun, embargo- 
enforcem ent brig, nam ed USS Oneida. Designed 
to chase sm all vessels sneaking contraband into 
h iding places an d  shallow  bays, she  w as no t a 
good fighting ship. On the  o ther hand , th an k s  
to  th e  fo re s ig h t of J o h n  G rav es  S im coe , 
lieu tenan t-governor of U pper C anada, in the 
1790s an d  G eneral Issac Brock after 1805, the 
Provincial Marine began the w ar on Lake Ontario 
with two brigs and five schooners carrying a  total 
of 105 guns. However, hav ing  a w ell-arm ed 
sq u ad ro n  and  knowing how to u se  it effectively 
as  a  fighting force are two different th ings. The 
Provincial M arine was com posed m ostly of local 
m erchan t sailors adm inistered  u n d e r a b ran ch  
of th e  B ritish  arm y . T h ese  v e sse ls  se rved  
prim arily  as arm ed tran sp o rts .
Nevertheless, the Am ericans knew they were 
in  tro u b le  a n d  a s s ig n e d  one  of th e ir  top  
adm inistrators to develop a naval yard a t Sackets 
H arbour on Lake O ntario. His orders were to 
immediately commence a  ship building program. 
A lthough  lim ited  in  w ar experience , Isaac  
Chauncey was a consum m ate organiser. His last
com m and was a t the New York Naval Yards and 
he knew  all the  righ t people in  the  righ t places. 
However, bu ild ing  a fleet takes  tim e an d  as a 
stopgap m easure Chauncey com m andeered and 
arm ed seven m erchan t schooners. Not designed 
to carry  heavy o rd inance on their u p p er decks, 
these schooners proved to be ungainly warships.
To u p g ra d e  th e  f ig h tin g  a b ility  of th e  
Provincial M arine, the  Royal Navy se n t one of 
their b e s t young com m odores along w ith 465 
officers and  ra tings  to operate the  sh ip s  of the 
Lake O ntario  squad ron . This d e tach m en t of 
R o y a l N avy p e r s o n n e l ,  in c lu d in g  fo u r  
com m anders, were all ve terans w ith a  w ealth  of 
sea  experience. Com m odore Sir Ja m e s  Lucas 
Yeo w as described  as a  zealous, en terp rising  
officer w hose daring  w as u n eq u a lled  in  the  
a n n u a ls  of the Royal Navy. Hence h is rap id  rise 
to flag ra n k  an d  h is kn ighthood a t the  age of 
thirty-one.
The p u rpose  of th is  article is to illu stra te  
th a t  th e  w ay in  w h ich  C h a u n c e y  a n d  Yeo 
conducted their operations on Lake Ontario was 
very m uch in keeping with their background and 
experience . It w as ev id en t from  th e ir  f irs t 
e n c o u n te r  th a t  Yeo, th e  v e te ra n , w as th e  
c o n fid e n t a g g re s s o r  w h ile  C h a u n c e y , th e  
adm inistrator, w as wary of the repu ta tion  of his 
k n ig h te d  o p p o n en t a n d  u n s u re  of h is  own 
sq u ad ro n ’s capabilities.
P a rt of th is  a s se s sm e n t h a s  been  m ade 
possib le by the  recen t discovery of the  sh ip ’s 
logbook of HMS Wolfe.1 The log is one of the
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m ost im portan t docum ents of the War of 1812 
b ecause  it is a record  of action  kep t by the 
flagship of Sir Ja m e s  Lucas Yeo from  May to 
December 1813. As such, the sh ip ’s log provides 
a detailed daily eyewitness account of a piece of 
m ilitary history  th a t decided the outcom e of the 
War of 1812, a w ar th a t  w ould determ ine the 
fu tu re  of the developing n a tio n  th a t  we call 
Canada.
Interestingly enough, all h istories of the War 
of 1812, until recentiy, have been written without 
reference to this essential docum ent. The reason 
for th is  is th a t the  existence of the log of HMS 
Wolfe rem ained unknow n for alm ost 160 years. 
Consequently, C anadian historians have written 
their accounts of the w ar w ithout the use  of th is 
im portan t firsthand  resource, resu lting  in more 
conjecture  th a n  tru th  in  th e ir in te rp re ta tions. 
All too often there  h a s  been  an  over reliance on 
American accounts th a t are abundan t, b u t have 
little C anadian perspective. While reports written 
by Yeo and  C hauncey  to th e ir superio rs  are 
helpful, it is im portan t to rem em ber th a t entries 
in  the  sh ip ’s log, un like personal reports, are 
based  on observed facts. There is no after-the- 
fact m assaging of inform ation to excuse actions, 
sa tisfy  egos or im press superio rs.
The Wolfe’s  log cam e to light by accident in 
1971 at the National Archives in W ashington D.C. 
D an Nelson, a dentist in St. C atharines, Ontario, 
fo u n d  th e  log w h ile  d o in g  r e s e a r c h  th a t  
eventually  led to the  discovery of the  su n k e n  
1812 A m erican schooners, USS Hamilton  and  
Scourge. They lie a t the bottom  of Lake O ntario 
n e a r  St. C a tharines. How the  logbook of the 
Wolfe found its way to W ashington was explained 
in a p a s t issue  of C anadian Military H istory.2
S k e p tic s  te n d  to p a s s  over th e  n a v y ’s 
con tribu tion  to the War of 1812 as little m ore 
th a n  a sh ip  build ing race an d  a gam e of hide 
an d  seek. It w as m uch  m ore th a n  th a t. Any 
m ilitary expert will agree th a t  naval control of 
the G reat Lakes, especially Lake O ntario, was 
the  key to m ilitary su ccess  in  the  War of 1812. 
Both com m anders knew  th a t  an d  certain ly  felt 
a great weight of responsibility. It is now possible 
to have a be tte r un d ers tan d in g  of the  actions of 
the respective com m anders. By tran sc rib in g  
p a rts  of the hand -w ritten  record  of the  W atch 
Officers of HMS Wolfe, we can  see how the  two 
com m anders conducted them selves during their 
f irs t e n c o u n te r  (A ugust 7 -1 0 , 1813) in  an  
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attem pt to gain suprem acy on Lake Ontario. For 
th a t  reason , ex tracts  from  the log of the Wolfe 
are  u sed  to form the  basis  of th is  article.
Except for the  fact th a t  it describes a way of life in  the  navy alm ost two h u n d red  years 
ago, a  sh ip ’s logbook is no t very exciting reading. 
It will be in te resting  fare to those readers who 
are devotees of Patrick O’Brien, a popular writer 
of 18th & 19th cen tu ry  seafaring  tales. M ost of 
a sh ip ’s logbook consists of day-to-day recording 
of routine information, such  as date, time of day, 
w ind d irection , w eather, s h ip ’s m ovem ents, 
location and employment of the crew. Every once 
in a while m ore exciting en tries can  be found in 
the  log, su c h  as sto rm s, enem y activity, and  
action taken. Logbook entries were m ade usually 
every four hou rs  or as  they occurred, depending 
on the Watch system  used  in a ship. Considered 
a m undane  chore, it w as a ta sk  assigned  to the 
ju n io r  officer or m idsh ipm an  of the  w atch  and  
checked for legibility an d  accuracy  by a sen ior 
officer. To a ss is t those readers who are less 
en ligh tened  in  naval term s an d  behaviour, the 
editor h as  inserted into the text a series of notes, 
in te rp re ta tio n s  a n d  o b se rv a tio n s  in  sq u a re  
brackets. To avoid excessive repetition, the editor 
h as  sum m arized the m undane recording of daily 
activities while a t sea  as “norm al ro u tin e .”
Within two weeks of arriving a t Kingston, Yeo 
led an  attack  against Sackets H arbour on 29 May 
1813. His p rim ary  objective w as to destroy  
Chauncey’s ship building yards and  ships under 
construction , th u s  crippling his ability to gain 
naval superiority . Since C hauncey  w as a t the 
o ther end  of the  lake causing  m ayhem  on the 
N iagara  P e n in su la , th e  a t ta c k  c a u g h t th e  
Am ericans by surprise  and  caused  considerable 
dam age. U nfortunately, G eneral Prevost, the 
Military Governor of C anada, chose to take p a rt 
in  th is  com bined am phib ious operation. His 
irreso lu te  leadersh ip  resu lted  in  a p rem atu re  
w ithdraw al of the land  forces and  a failure to 
a tta in  all of the  objectives. However, C hauncey  
w as so a larm ed a t th is  a ttack  aga in st h is naval 
base  th a t he abandoned  the A m erican arm y on 
the Niagara Peninsula and  raced back to Sackets 
H arbour. He rem ained  there  for the  next two 
m on ths repairing  the dam age to h is naval yard  
and  the  sh ip s th a t  were u n d e r construction , 
especially  the  USS Pike. By default, he left 
control of the Lake Ontario to Yeo and  his British
squadron. W hen Yeo appeared  off Grimsby with 
h is fleet, the  A m erican arm y w as com pletely 
intimidated. Fresh from their sk irm ish at Stoney 
Creek, they abandoned  their cam p a t the  Forty 
Mile Creek (Grimsby) an d  ru sh e d  back  to the 
security of their bridgehead on the Niagara River. 
This is an  excellent illu stra tion  of how naval 
control of the lake influenced the action of land  
forces.
A lthough the  Wolfe took p a rt in the  a ttack  
on S ackets H arbour, there  is no record of th is  
action in the log. The pages are sim ply m issing. 
The sh ip  was launched  a t Kingston, O ntario on 
23 April 1813. C om m odore Yeo a rrived  in  
K ingston on 16 May 1813 to take  com m and of 
h is squ ad ro n  and  new  flagship. The squ ad ro n  
se t sail to a ttack  the A m erican naval base  a t 
Sackets H arbour on 27 May 1813. At some point 
betw een 23 April and  27 May an  active sh ip ’s 
log w ould have been  in itia ted . However, the 
W olfe’s  log as  it w as found  in  th e  N ational 
Archives of W ashington D.C. begins on 8 Ju n e  
1813 a t the  m ou th  of Forty Mile Creek. At least 
two w eeks of record keeping are  m issing. It is a 
mystery as to w hat could possibly have happened 
to the vital en tries th a t  w ould have tak en  place 
during  the  Battle of Sackets H arbour. However, 
the  log does offer som e clues an d  they  are  
p e r t in e n t  to se ttin g  th e  s tag e  for th e  firs t 
encounter.
T h e  f i r s t  s u rv iv in g  p a g e  o f th e  log, 
com m encing w ith en tries for 8 J u n e  1813, is 
stained. This m ay be an  indication th a t the first
pages of the log were dam aged. This could have 
h ap p en ed  w hen the  log w as cap tu red  or by 
im proper sto rage  by the  Naval D ep a rtm en t 
before the  docum ent w as tu rn e d  over to the 
National Archives. It is also possible th a t the first 
few pages were rem oved on purpose specifically 
because  they  contained  a  record of the Battle of 
Sackets H arbour. The ba ttle  did no t go well for 
the  A m ericans an d  there  w as a  lot of finger 
pointing th a t  resu lted  in  co u rts  of inquiry. It is 
therefore possible th a t these pages becam e part 
of the  tria l reco rds a n d  were n o t re tu rn ed . 
However, it w ould be custom ary  to su b m it the 
en tire  log to su c h  p roceed ings ra th e r  th a n  
remove the  pages.
The b es t clue can  be found on the  la s t page 
of the  log. Com m odore C hauncey  signed it off 
before forwarding this piece of enemy intelligence 
to W ashington. As sen io r officer on the  G reat 
Lakes, Chauncey was accountable for all actions 
u n d er h is com m and. This was especially true  of 
h is  h e a d q u a r te rs  a t S ack e ts  H arbour, even 
though  he w as no t p resen t during  the ba ttle  on 
29  M ay. H ow ever, h is  y o u n g e r  b r o th e r ,  
L ieu tenan t Wolcott C hauncey  was, an d  did not 
c o n d u c t h im se lf well. M aster C om m an d an t 
Leonard, who also w as a t S acke ts  H arbou r 
confided to Navy Secretary  Jo n e s  th a t  m any 
officers su sp e c te d  L ie u te n a n t C h au n cey  of 
cowardice in  re trea ting  u p  the  bay. He claim ed 
th a t the com m odore p laced officers friendly to 
him self on his b ro ther’s court of inquiry in  order 
to acqu it him . He thereby  screened  the  guilty 
party  an d  caused  those who lacked friends in
Forty Mile Creek, 8 June 1813
A perfect example of how naval 
control of Lake Ontario influenced 
the action of land forces occurred at 
the mouth of Forty Mile Creek 
(Grimsby), two days after the Battle 
of Stoney Creek. The sudden 
appearance of the British Squadron 
caused the Americans to make a 
precipitous retreat back to their 
bridgehead on the Niagara River, 
abandoning all of their equipment 
and newly-arrived supplies.
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high p laces to be a rrested , tried  an d  convicted 
as scapegoats, w ith the  exception of Sailing 
M a s te r  H u t to n . He w a s  o rd e re d  by  th e  
com m odore to a d ju s t h is acco u n t of the  battle  
before being se t free to leave the  h a rb o u r.3 It is 
very possible th a t the log contained inform ation 
th a t h ad  to be censored because  it contradicted  
fac ts  in  the  com m odore’s b a ttle  rep o rt and  
inquiry  proceedings. If th is  is true , th en  all his 
action  reports, in p articu la r h is accoun ts  of his 
first encounter with Yeo, shou ld  be viewed with 
a jaund iced  eye.
The story  of the  first en coun ter begins on 
30 J u n e  after Yeo, in the  absence  of A m erican 
opposition, had  spent a m onth  raiding American 
su p p ly  lines along the  so u th  sho re  of Lake 
O ntario. Now he h ad  to p repare  h is sq u ad ro n  
for the  inevitable en co u n te r w ith the  A m erican 
s q u a d ro n  a n d  so  r e tu rn e d  to  h is  b a s e  a t 
Kingston.
“W hipping” the Squadron in to  Shape
Wednesday, June 30
A.M. Clear, fine weather. [Normal routine]
P.M. At 5.00 P.M. all hands, except a few 
marines [guard duty]
embarked in the gun boats accompanied 
by the boats & crews of the squadron and 
a detachment of the 1st & 100th [Foot Reg’t.] 
for Sackets Harbour.
On the  afternoon of 30 Ju n e , a raid ing  party  
was assem bled a t the squadron  anchorage near 
Nine Mile Point on Sim coe Island . Yeo w as 
h au n ted  by the fact th a t the building of the USS 
Pike  in  S a c k e ts  H a rb o u r  w ou ld  sw ing  th e  
b a la n c e  of n a v a l p o w er on  L ake O n ta rio  
com pletely in  favour of the  U nited S ta tes. His 
first a ttem p t to destroy the  Pike on 30 May had  
failed because of General Prevost’s interference 
an d  lack of m ilitary fibre. Yeo w as determ ined  
to go back  and  finish the job with a raiding party  
of 700 sailors, m arines an d  soldiers from the 
1st and 100th Foot Regiment as well as the Royal 
Newfoundland Fencibles. This raid  w as the type 
of combined operation upon which Yeo had  made 
his repu ta tion  and  received his knighthood.
In 1800, 18-year-old Ja m e s  Yeo, while in 
com m and of the boats of the brig HMS El Corso,
entered  the Adriatic h a rb o u r of Cesenatico and  
b u rn ed  or s a n k  13 enem y m erch an t vessels. 
Again in  1805, while in  com m and of the  boats  
of HMS Loire an d  an  a ssa u lt  party  of 50 m en, 
he sto rm ed  the  fort in  M uros Bay, spiking 12 
guns and  allowing the Loire to enter the harbour 
and  seize a large privateer. The p rivateer was 
renam ed  HMS Confiance an d  given to Yeo as 
h is first com m and. Four years la te r in 1809, he 
led a m ixed force of 400  m en, com posed of h is 
ship 's com pany and  Portuguese soldiers against 
a  F rench  fort in Cayenne. They cap tu red  the 
S ou th  Am erican fort despite the fact th a t 1,200 
m en  a n d  2 0 0  g u n s  d e fe n d e d  it. For th is  
audacious achievem ent, the Prince Regent of 
Portugal nom inated  Yeo a Knight C om m ander 
of St. Benedict. King George III approved Yeo’s 
acceptance of the order. 4
The Sackets H arbour raid  set off a t 5:00 pm  
in tend ing  to arrive before daw n the  next day. 
However, it took longer to cover the  35 miles 
across the lake th an  expected and it was daylight 
before they  arrived. Unable to m ake a daylight 
a ttack  or chance being caugh t in the  open on 
the lake, Yeo took shelter in the forest along the 
shore  of C haum ont Bay opposite the harbour, 
aw aiting night fall to continue the  a ttack . Later 
in  the  day during  m uster, it w as found th a t two 
soldiers were m issing. A patro lling  A m erican 
schooner discovered the deserters and  sounded 
the alarm . As soon as d a rk n ess  fell, the  B ritish 
raiding party  wisely re tu rn ed  to K ingston while 
the  A m ericans stiffened their defenses, placing 
400  m en on the  Pike, a lone.5
It is in teresting  to note th a t  Yeo m ade no 
m ention  of th is  aborted  ra id  in  h is report to 
London on 16 July. This is understandable given 
his failure to see eye to eye with Governor Prevost 
on m ilitary operations and  his need to m ain tain  
h is  h ig h  re p u ta tio n  w ith  th e  L ords of the  
A dm ira lty . However, it does i l lu s tr a te  th e  
aggressive n a tu re  of Com m odore Yeo an d  his 
d e te rm in a tio n  to carry  o u t h is  m an d a te  to 
m ain ta in  naval superiority  on Lake Ontario.
Saturday, July 3
A.M. C lear, moderate westerly breezes.
RM. At 6.00 an American schooner hove
in sight bearing a flag of truce. Came to
anchor under 12 Mile Point.
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Eastern Lake Ontario - This map shows the juxtaposition of the British Naval Base at Kingston 
and the American Naval Base at Sackets Harbour. Chaumont Bay is where Commodore Yeo 
took shelter on his aborted commando-type raid against Chauncey’s squadron on 1 July 1813.
No fu rth e r in form ation  w as provided in Yeo’s 
rep o rt or any  o th e r  so u rces  to exp la in  the  
p resence  of the  Am erican ship. However, we do 
know  th a t  C hauncey  a t th is  tim e w as u n d e r a 
great deal of p re ssu re  from  S ecretary  of War 
Jo h n  A rm strong. More accu ra te  inform ation 
ab o u t the  a rm am en t of the  B ritish  squadron , 
sh ip  construction  and  the defenses a t Kingston 
was needed. Because the Am erican offensive on 
the Niagara frontier had  stalled, a m ajor shift in 
A m erican stra tegy  w as in  the  offing. On 6 Ju ly  
A rm stro n g  no tified  G eneral D ea rb o rn  th a t  
President M adison wished him  to withdraw from 
h is com m and a t Fort George an d  the Niagara 
frontier due to ill h ea lth .6 A rm strong w anted  to 
m ake Kingston and  M ontreal the focus of fu ture 
Am erican attacks.
The p resence  of the  A m erican schooner 
u n d e r a flag of truce  can  be explained as an  
a ttem p t to negotiate a p risoner exchange. The 
B ritish squadron  had  ju s t  recently arrived back 
in  K ingston w ith A m erican p risoners tak en  a t 
Beaver Dam s. It would have been a good excuse 
for the Americans to use a flag of truce to disguise 
an  intelligence gathering  operation. Four days 
later on 7 Ju ly  Yeo sen t Mr. McKinsee in a sm all 
boat with a flag of truce to Sackets Harbour. Yeo
w as probably  looking for a p rogress report on 
the construction  of the new Am erican ship  Pike.
Monday, July 5
A.M. Fresh breezes & clear. At 10:00 
punished the following men viz. [namely]: 
Thos. Codwell 24 lashes for drunkenness, 
John Maplin 12 lashes for not rinsing the 
coppers clean [large boiler used for cooking 
or laundry], Peter Blundel 24 lashes for 
disobedience of orders, Michael Carey 12 
lashes for drunkenness, William Miller 35 
lashes for drunkenness & making use of 
improper language, John Peirce 48 lashes 
for drunkenness & theft, Ian Garress 48 
lashes for drunkenness & contempt, Wm. 
Ludd 48 for riotous conduct, Joseph 
Larreaux 48 lashes for being drunk on post 
and Jas. Busby 48 lashes for duty neglect 
and disobedience of orders.
At sunset, squadron in company at anchor.
The record  of p u n ish m en t se t down in the 
log begins to p a in t an  in teresting  p ictu re  of the 
m a n p o w e r  s i tu a t io n  fac e d  by  Yeo in  h is  
s q u a d ro n . O n 21 J u n e ,  se v e n  m en  w ere
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pun ished . On 30 Ju n e , two soldiers deserted  
on the  S ackets  H arbour raid . The en try  above 
for 5 Ju ly  lists  p u n ish m en t for ten  m ore m en 
[Michael Carey’s nam e ap p ears  for a second 
time]. Three days later on 8 Ju ly , two more m en 
w ere p u n is h e d  [Thos. B ray  24 la s h e s  for 
insolence to h is su p e rio r officer an d  Robert 
W haling 36 lash es  for neglect of duty]. The 
B ritish navy had  a serious m anpow er shortage. 
Im pressm ent of m erchan t sailors and  the dregs 
of every po rt w as a com m on practice . Even 
A m erican sailors, ostensib ly  B ritish  deserters, 
were im pressed  before the  war. Consequently , 
d ra fts  of seam en  for th e  G rea t L akes were 
com posed of tro u b lem ak ers  th a t  any  sh ip ’s 
m aste r would be glad to be rid of. P art of the 
p ro b le m  c o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  in  le a d e rs h ip .  
L ie u te n a n t R obert G ibbs of th e  Wolfe an d  
L ieu tenan t George Inglis of the  Royal George 
were d ru n k  and  behaved  in  an  ungen tlem anly  
m an n er while left in  charge during  the flotilla’s 
absence a t Sackets H arbour. These two officers 
h ad  been detached by Admiral W arren in Halifax 
and  had  arrived in Kingston w ith Robert Barclay 
who was in com m and un til Yeo arrived. Barclay 
h a d  com p la in ed  to Yeo a b o u t th e ir  ea rlie r  
behavior. After a  quick investigation, an d  since 
Yeo h a d  no au th o rity  to hold cou rts  m artial, 
Gibbs w as re tu rn ed  to Halifax u n d e r a rrest. 
Inglis w as saved from  a sim ila r fate by the  
in terven tion  of C om m ander Sp ilsbury  of the 
B eresford .7
F u rth e rm o re , som e of the  crew m em bers 
were m ade up  of the original Provincial M arine 
a dom estic navy th a t h a d  operated  u n d e r the 
com m and of the  arm y. W hen Yeo took over 
com m and, control of the squad ron  cam e u n d er 
the auspices of the British Admiralty. These local 
b o y s  of th e  P ro v in c ia l  M a rin e  w ere  n o t  
accustom ed  to the discipline of the Royal Navy. 
Som e of th em  res ig n ed , c o m p o u n d in g  the  
m anpow er shortage. To m ake th ings worse, Yeo 
w as hav ing  p rob lem s w ith  the  pay  system . 
Exacerbating all of these difficulties was the fact 
th a t  Yeo h ad  to send  officers an d  m en to the 
S qu ad ro n s on Lakes Erie and  C ham plain . One 
can only wonder a t the quality of m en forwarded 
to these s ta tions a t the end of the supp ly  chain.
Given these  exigencies, it is no t su rp ris ing  
to find th a t m ost of Yeo’s report to the Admiralty 
on J u ly  16 c o n c en tra te d  on h is  m anpow er 
sho rtage . He w rote the  following, an  edited  
version of h is report:
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The officers and  m en which came from England 
[with Yeo] are scarcely sufficient to m an  the 
squadron on this lake. I have appointed Captains 
Barclay and Finnis with three lieutenants to Lake 
Erie an d  C aptain  Pring to com m and the naval 
force on Lake C ham plain . I have ju d g e d  it 
expedient to prom ote two m idshipm en to the 
ran k  of lieu tenan t to serve u n d er th a t officer.
I w ish to draw  the atten tion  of the ir Lordships 
to the fact th a t we could not m aintain superiority 
[on the Lakes] w ithout a reinforcem ent being 
sen t im m ediately. The enem y h a s  every facility 
and  m eans of obtaining w hatever they s ta n d  in 
need of in  a few days from the ir rivers [and 
ports].
With respect to the  paym ent of seam en  of the 
Provincial or old M arine, I am  sorry to say  th a t 
it h a s  b e e n  a  ta s k  of in fin ite  la b o u r  a n d  
perseverance since my arrival to th row  the 
form er arrangem en ts in  som e m easure  into a 
system  agreeably to the books of the navy. I beg 
leave further to state th a t the seam en will receive 
b u t one m onth’s wages out of every two th a t may 
becom e due.
I am  happy  to s ta te  th a t only one seam an  has 
deserted  to the  enem y an d  the ir conduct in 
g en e ra l h a s  b ee n  orderly  a n d  good. Every 
reasonab le an d  proper indulgence has been 
given them  to keep them  in th is temper, b u t the 
encouragem ent th a t is held o u t by agents of the 
enemy, of which there are m any in this province, 
m ay I fear seduce them  in time.
In U pper C anada, 60% of the in h ab itan ts  
were newly-arrived Am erican settlers, people of 
u n c e r ta in  loyalties , lu re d  from  New York, 
Pennsylvania and  New England by the  prom ise 
of cheap land. M any of them  expressed  pro- 
A m erican sym pathy, openly.8 Accordingly, it 
w ould appear th a t  Yeo h ad  good reason  to be 
concerned abou t sedition.
The British squadron  rem ained in Kingston 
H a rb o u r for the  en tire  m o n th  of Ju ly . The 
schooners, Beresford  an d  Earl o f Moira were 
sen t ou t on patro ls to keep an  eye on the enemy 
while Yeo p repared  h is sq u ad ro n  for w hat he 
considered to be a showdown for control of Lake 
O ntario. He w as w aiting for the com pletion of a 
new  sh ip  for h is sq u ad ro n  to balance the  odds. 
He w as also w aiting for the arrival of m ore m en 
to sail his ships and m an  the guns. Soldiers were 
being tra ined  for the la tte r  duty. His own ship, 
Wolfe, h ad  p u t to sea prem aturely  for the a ttack  
on Sackets H arbour in  May an d  needed a lot of 
finishing work, equipping, caulking, rigging and 
pain ting . He also w anted  heavier a rm am en t to 
increase  the  firepower of h is squadron . All of
th is  can  be seen  in ano th er ex trac t from  h is 16 
Ju ly  Report to the  Adm iralty and  a synopsis of 
the  sh ip ’s log for July .
O ur new  brig, the Melville, will be launched  this 
week w hen the two squadrons will be in as great 
a force as they can for this year, and immediately 
we are bo th  ready, a general action m u st take 
place as every m ilitary operation  or success 
depends entirely on whoever can  m aintain naval 
superiority  on the lake.9
Tuesday, July 6
Sent 18 pounder carronades ashore & 
received 32 pounders in their place
Tuesday, July 20
Exercised with the great guns, firing at a 
target. 14 seamen joined the ship from the 
Quebec Volunteers. A draft of 65 volunteers 
from the merchant fleet at Quebec arrived 
on this day. They were enticed by a contract 
that defined their wages, length of service 
and prize money or bounties.10
Thursday, July 22
At 6 [pm] the new brig M elville  was 
launched.
The new ship  was 71 feet long with a beam  of 24 
feet and  a d raugh t of 9 feet. She was arm ed with 
12 x 32 pound  carronades an d  2 x 1 8  pound  
long gun  cannons. She h a d  a crew of 60 m en 
an d  38 m arines. C om m ander F. Sp ilsbury  w as 
in com m and.11 On this day the newly completed 
USS Pike, the A m erican flagship, se t sail from 
Sackets H arbour to rendezvous w ith the  res t of 
the A m erican S quad ron  offshore in  the vicinity 
of the  D ucks Islands. It w ould be an o th er nine 
days before the  B ritish  S quad ron  w as ready to 
sail. The A m ericans h ad  tem porary  control of 
the lake b u t instead of attacking Kingston where 
they  could expect a ho t reception, they headed  
w estw ard to suppo rt the Am erican Army on the 
Niagara Peninsula.
Wednesday, July 28
the officers & men of the NFL 
[Newfoundland] Reg’t. discharged & a 
detachment of the 100th Foot Reg’t. joined 
the ship as marines.
No Avoiding a D ecisive Naval A ction
T ie  B ritish  squad ron , now in full fighting trim , se t sail from K ingston on 31 Ju ly  in 
search  of the Am erican squadron  w hich had  set 
sail several days before and  were causing  some 
m ischief a t the  w estern  end of Lake Ontario. 
G o v e rn o r  G e n e ra l  P re v o s t ,  th e  t im id  
Commander-in-Chief, w atched them  depart and 
w ith  g re a t tre p id a tio n  w ro te  th e  follow ing 
m essage to h is superior, Lord B athurst. The tone 
of his writing gives a clue to h is tim idity through 
the style of his sentence phrasing  which employs 
the  word “avoided.”
It is scarcely possible th a t a  decisive naval action 
can  be avoided. I therefore hum bly  hope th a t 
His Royal H ighness, th e  Prince Regent, will 
approve of it being courted by us, as a  necessary 
m easure  for the preservation  of the advanced 
positions of h is arm y, w hich I have determ ined 
to m ain ta in  un til the naval ascendancy on Lake 
O ntario  is decided.”12
Prevost felt th a t the British forces were over­
extended in Upper C anada and  would have liked 
any opportunity  to pull back  and  consolidate in 
K ingston  or M on trea l. T h is  s e n se  becam e 
p redom inan t after Com m odore Perry’s victory 
on Lake Erie and  the defeat of the B ritish forces 
w ithdrawing from the Detroit Frontier. It is quite 
possible th a t  if Prevost h a d  h a d  h is way, m uch 
of S ou thern  O ntario would be p a rt of the United 
S tates today.
After four days of sailing  aga in st light and  
westerly winds, on 4 August the British squadron 
had  progressed no fu rther th an  Presqu’ile Point, 
a  dozen m iles w est of T renton . Not u n til noon 
on 6 A ugust did the  sq u ad ro n  reach  York.
Friday, August 6
A.M. Light airs Sly. Standing to the 
westward. Made & shortened sail 
occasionally. Employed [crew] as duty 
required. At Noon, calm. Highlands of York 
[Scarborough Bluffs] bore WNW at about 6 
miles. P.M. Light breezes & Very warm. 
Squadron in Company. At 9 [pm] abreast 
highlands, bore away for Niagara SSE. At 
Midnight Light airs & calm. Squadron in 
Company.
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Saturday, August 7
A.M. Light breezes & hot weather. At 4.30 
[am] Niagara River bore SE distance about 
10 miles. Wind SW. Squadron in Company 
on the starboard tack. At 5 [am] discovered 
the enemy squadron at anchor close in 
shore about 4 miles to the eastward of the 
Niagara River.
Immediately cleared for action. At 5.20 [am], 
observed the enemy squadron consisting 
of two ships [in the 18th century, a ship was 
any vessel with three or more masts square 
rigged and suitable for navigating the high 
seas], one brig [a two-masted vessel with a 
mixture of square and fore-and-aft sails], 
ten schooners weigh and make sail, turning 
to windward along the shore [toward the 
mouth of the Niagara River]. At 6 [am] 
observed him form his line on the larboard 
[port] tack, his van consisting of the ship 
General Pike, brig Oneida and two 
schooners. In the centre, the ship Madison, 
& two schooners. In the rear six schooners. 
At 7.30 [am] the enemy, steering large on 
the larboard tack, fired a broadside which 
fell short.
„ 4:30am
Lake  O n t a r i o
-------»
British
American
12:00 Noon
To stee r large m eans to tu rn  a sh ip  w ithout 
changing  the position  of the  sails, i.e. w ithout 
tacking. The A m erican squ ad ro n  w as sailing 
west, parallel to the shore  on a larboard  tack  
[wind on their left] w ith a SW wind a few poin ts 
ahead  of their beam . They tu rn ed  right w ith the 
wind passing astern  so tha t they were now sailing 
in a n o rth e a s t direction, away from the  shore  
with the wind behind them . The probable reason 
for C hauncey’s action  w as th a t  he did no t wish 
to fight a ba ttle  trapped  betw een the  shore  and  
the approaching enemy squadron. It was a t th is 
po in t th a t  he fired a long-range broadside. The 
log of the  Wolfe records,
At the same time we bore up [headed more 
into the wind in order to put the squadron in 
a better position to fire a broadside] and 
made sail to close with the enemy who 
immediately wore [to wear means to change 
the wind from one side of the sail to the other 
with the stern passing through the wind] and 
stood in under their batteries [at Fort 
Niagara],
It is clear from this description th a t the American 
sq u ad ro n  tu rn e d  away and  refused  battle . The 
fact th a t  they  stood in u n d e r their own shore 
b a tte ries  explains why the A m ericans did no t 
sail o u t into the lake w hen they 
first weighed anchor. C hauncey  
g  w as fou r m iles ea s t of N iagara 
d w hen the  enem y hove into sight 
and  h is m anoeuvres indicate th a t 
-3 he w anted, first an d  forem ost, to
CD
S be close to the covering fire of Fort 
° N iagara’s long-range guns. All h is 
|  reports  show ed th a t he believed 
g th a t  the  B ritish  ou t-gunned  him. 
2 His sense  of inferiority w as not 
o helped by the  fact th a t th is  was 
S' h is  first en coun ter w ith Yeo, the 
ro seasoned  ve te ran  an d  kn igh ted  
hero  w ith h is w ell-trained Royal 
Navy crews. He is likely to have 
h a d  a g u a rd e d  re sp e c t for h is  
enem y’s repu ta tion . A few weeks 
after th is  first encounter, A rthur
Squadron courses, 7 August 1813
The first encounter between the commodores 
occurred north of the mouth of the Niagara River, 
with the squadrons following these courses as 
indicated by the Wolfe logbook, official reports and 
eyewitness accounts.
S miles 
zl
Sinclair, cap ta in  of the  flagship, General Pike, 
w ro te  to a frien d  th a t ,  “Yeo w as a sk ilfu l 
com m an d er a n d  th e  B ritish  s q u a d ro n  w as 
com posed of regu lation  b u ilt vessels of war. 
They h ad  sim ilar sailing  charac te ris tic s  and  
were very capable of acting efficiently in support 
of e a c h  o th e r .”13 A g g rav a tin g  C h a u n c e y ’s 
concerns w as the fact th a t his own m anoeuvres 
were ham pered  by h is dull sailing schooners 
an d  Oneida. It m ay be th a t  he  w as sh a k en  by 
the efficient appearance of the British squadron  
and  decided discretion  w as the b e tte r  p a rt  of 
valour. In the end, Yeo w as unab le  to bring  
C hauncey  to action  on 7 A ugust 1813.
At 10 [am], light breezes Sly. Stood off with 
the squadron on the larboard tack. The 
enemy kept close in with the land.
At Noon, light airs Sly. Squadron standing 
on the starboard tack, the enemy to 
windward close in shore.
P.M., Light airs Wly. Squadron standing to 
the northward on the larboard tack. At 
sunset, north lighthouse [York] NE by E 10 
miles & the enemy squadron SE distant 5 
or 6 leagues, [one league = 18,246 feet or 
3.5 statute miles. 6 leagues = 21.0 miles]
At 9 [pm] a breeze sprung up from the 
westward. Tacked with the squadron & 
stood to the southward.
Midnight, moderate breezes westerly.
At the end of the day, one can  only m ake the 
following conclusion . W hile safe in  S acke ts  
H arbour, C hauncey  claim ed he w as chom ping 
a t  th e  b it to ge t a t  th e  enem y. W hen th e  
opportun ity  to confront the enem y off Niagara 
presented itself, he clearly took avoidance action. 
F urtherm ore , he refused  to come ou t into the 
open lake to do ba ttle  even though  the  B ritish  
squadron  sailed back  and  forth tau n tin g  him  to 
do so.
The B ritish  noticed the c lum siness of some 
of the American vessels and the lack of squadron 
discipline. Som e of the  schooners were towed 
by a m other sh ip  to keep them  in place. It was 
these circum stances th a t were to play out in  the 
events of the nex t 48 h ou rs. At su n se t on 7 
A ugust as the B ritish  sq u ad ro n  stood close to 
York on th e  n o r th  s h o re  of th e  lake , th e
A m ericans patro lled  the  so u th  shore, in  easy 
reach  of Niagara. At two o’clock in the m orning, 
while in  the  vicinity of Port D alhousie, a squall 
line h it the  A m erican fleet while m ost of the 
sailors were asleep below decks. W ith sails se t 
to catch  the light m orning breezes and  few m en 
on watch, Chauncey’s ships heeled over violently, 
especially two converted m erch an t schooners, 
Hamilton  an d  Scourge. Unlike the  res t of the 
sc h o o n e rs  th a t  c a rried  only two g u n s , th e  
Hamilton  m oun ted  nine guns and  the  Scourge 
ten . This fea tu re  m ade th en  dangerously  top 
heavy an d  they failed to right them selves in  the 
sudden  gale. Water flooded into the open hatches 
an d  the  sh ip s  sa n k  w ithin  m inu tes. It w as not 
un til first light th a t the  scale of the tragedy was 
u n v e ile d . S h ip s  in  C h a u n c e y ’s s q u a d ro n  
reported  picking 16 m en  ou t of the water. More 
th a n  80 m en of the Hamilton and  Scourge  were 
m issing. The squall e ither m issed  the  B ritish  
sh ips as  they  sailed tow ards the  so u th  shore or 
w as of no consequence to them , as  it w as not 
recorded in  the log of the Wolfe as show n below.
Sunday, August 8
A.M. Light breezes & very hot weather, At 
5 [am] Hot. 40 Mile Creek bore S.S.W. at 
about 8 miles. Winds Sly. Saw the enemy 
squadron bearing E. by S. about 4 or 5 
leagues [16 miles] standing to the westward 
on the larboard tack.
This observation, m ade only a few h o u rs  after 
th e  H am ilton  a n d  Scourge  san k , p laced  the 
A m erican sq u ad ro n  a  few m iles off shore  in  the 
app roaches to the  m odern  day W elland Canal. 
At first light, the Am erican sh ips were searching 
the  la s t know n position  of the  Hamilton and  
Scourge for survivors. One h u n d red  an d  sixty 
years la ter the above log entry helped define the 
search  area for Dr. Nelson of St. Catharines when 
he se t o u t to discover the  resting  place of these  
two schooners. They were found in  1975 by 
using  so n ar scann ing  of the lake bottom  in th is 
vicinity. The log continues:
At the same time we made sail and stood 
towards [the enemy]. At 7.30, the breeze 
died away and was succeeded by light 
variable airs. At 11.00 [am] sent Lieut. Scott 
with a boat ashore to communicate with our 
army.
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The Wolfe’s Log Reveals a Secret - The bearings illustrated on this map were taken only a few hours after the USS 
Hamilton & Scourge sank. The American squadron was sighted in the rescue area at first light by Yeo’s Navigator on 
HMS Wolfe at 5 am. This record led to the discovery of these vessels on the lake bed 160 years later.
At Noon, calm - squadron in company. 12 
Mile Creek S.E. about 5 m iles [Port 
Dalhousie]. The boat returned on board 
from shore. The enemy squadron E.N.E. 
about 8 miles apparently becalmed [about 
4 miles northwest of Niagara],
P.M. Squally with some rain, a breeze 
springing up from the southward. The 
enemy formed their line & stood towards 
us. At 3.30 [pm] wore & bore down to close 
with him. At 4.00 [pm] observed him wear 
round & steer large for Niagara. At the same 
time, a boat came off from our army with 
d ispatches. At 5.00 [pm] the enemy 
anchored under their fort. At 5.30 [pm] came 
a strong squall from the eastward, reefed 
the topsail. At sunset, Niagara bore S.E. 
about [not legible]. The enemy remained at 
anchor under the fort.
Midnight: Moderate weather, squadron in 
company.
Chauncey’s account of the events of 8 August 
a p p e a re d  in  a re p o rt th a t  h e  w ro te  to  the  
Secre tary  of the Navy, William Jo n es, on 13 
A ugust 1813.14 It is revealing to com pare h is 
opinions w ith the facts in  the  log of the  Wolfe.
This acciden t [the loss of the  Hamilton  and  
Scourge] gave to th e  enem y dec ided ly  th e  
su p e rio rity , a n d  I th o u g h t he w ould  ta k e  
advantage of it, particu larly  being to w indw ard 
of me.
Yeo w as no t aw are of the loss of the Hamilton 
an d  Scourge u n til 10 A ugust. C hauncey  w as 
parano id  of the B ritish  getting  to w indw ard of 
him  and  being able to out m aneuver him  despite 
the fact th a t the log of the Wolfe reports th a t the 
w in d s w ere ligh t a n d  v a riab le . The rep o rt 
continues:
Soon after 6 am  the enem y bore u p  w ith the 
in ten tion  of bringing u s  to action. W hen he 
approached  u s  w ithin four miles he cam e to 
[stopped]. F ind ing  th a t  th e  enem y h a d  no 
in ten tion  of bringing u s  to action, I edged away 
to gain the land  in  o rder to have the  advantage 
of the land  breeze in the afternoon. [The British 
sq u ad ro n  cam e to because the w ind died]. It 
soon after fell calm an d  I directed the schooners 
to sweep up  [row] and  engage the enemy. [With 
th e ir  o a rs  an d  long-range g u n s  they  could  
m a n eu v e r a n d  fire w ith  im p u n ity  in  calm  
conditions]. W hen the van of the schooners was 
w ithin two miles of the enemy, the wind shifted 
to the w estw ard, w hich b rough t the enem y to 
w indw ard . He bore u p  in  o rder to c u t the  
schooners off before they could rejoin me b u t in 
th is  he w as foiled. It soon becam e squally  and  
as  we h ad  been  a t q u arte rs  for nearly  48 hou rs
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an d  being  app rehensive  of se p ara tin g  from 
som e of the heavy sailing  schooners in  the 
squall, induced  me to ru n  in tow ards Niagara 
an d  ancho r outside the bar.
C hauncey’s las t sen tence  show s how the 
sequence of inform ation can  be ad justed  to su it 
the circum stances. W hat came first, the running 
into h a rb o u r or the  squalls?  According to the 
log of the  Wolfe, w here specific tim e references 
are  m ade, a t 4 .00 pm , C hauncey  wore a round  
an d  steered  large for N iagara an d  a t 5 .30 pm  a 
strong  squall cam e from the  eastw ard . It is 
im portan t to rem em ber th a t  the  officer of the 
w atch m ade the  en tries in the  Wolfe’s log as the 
e v e n ts  o c c u rre d , n o t a f te r  th e  fa c t w h en  
ad ju s tm en ts  could be m ade to ju stify  actions. 
W ith  th is  in  m in d , C h a u n c e y ’s r e p o r t s  
som etim es appear m ore like excuses th a n  an  
u n b iased  record of fact.
Monday, August 9
A.M. Moderate weather. At daylight, 
Niagara bore S.S.E. about 4 or 5 leagues 
distant [14 or 17.5 miles]. The enemy
squadron at anchor under the fort. Hauled 
our wind on the larboard tack & stood 
towards York. At 11.00 [am] town of York 
N.W. 5 m iles, hove to, squadron in 
company. At noon, light airs, squadron lying 
to. [“lie to” means to bring a vessel almost 
to a standstill with her bow as near the wind 
as possible] A boat came off from the shore 
by which the American prisoners were sent 
off. [These prisoners were probably brought 
on board by Lieut. Scott after he went 
ashore on Sunday to meet with the army]
P.M. Clear Weather, squadron in company 
laying to, off York.
After two days of sailing w ith long periods 
a t battle stations and the enemy showing no signs 
of leaving the  security  of the N iagara area, Yeo 
stood his crews down for the afternoon while he 
w rote a report to Governor Prevost:
I m uch  fear Mr. C hauncey will no t engage If he 
can  help It, except in  h is  own po rt or in  a calm  
w hen his schooners [under oars] would gain him  
victory w ithout h is  having a sh o t fired a t him .
Mr. Chauncey Will Not Engage - Commodore Yeo observed that Chauncey would not engage except in his own port or 
in a calm when his schooners, under oars, gave him a tactical advantage. Insecure in his own mind and unsure of his 
squadron’s fighting ability, Chauncey stayed close to the protection of Fort Niagara and sanctuary of the Niagara River.
Fort Niagara 1813
When the Americans captured Fort George on the Canadian side of the Niagara River in April 1813, the river mouth 
became a military port for Commodore Chauncey. It served as his escape hatch for naval operations at the western 
end of Lake Ontario.
[the B ritish  w ere m ain ly  a rm ed  w ith  sh o rt 
range, heavy calibre carronade]....The Pike is 
a very fine large sh ip  b u t appears to be very 
unwieldy, an d  from the m an n er she is worked,
I shou ld  judge is not com plete w ith seam en.
[The Pike had  a full com plem ent b u t being so 
recently  launched  an d  ru sh ed  to sea, she had  
h a d  little tim e for w ork-ups to im prove the 
efficiency of h e r crew.] The M adison is abou t 
the  size of the Wolfe, sa ils well an d  is m anaged 
m uch  better th a n  the Pike. The O neida is small 
a n d  s a i ls  b a d , a n d  th e  s c h o o n e r s ,  th o ’ 
form idable in a  calm  are very contem ptible. My 
hope is they m ay rem ain  ou t a t n igh t w hen we 
m ay be able to close w ith them  before they see 
u s  an d  from the ir nu m b er [and poor sailing 
characteristics] will be m uch  d ispersed .15
T h e re  w a s  a la rg e  d if fe re n c e  in  th e  
com position of the  two squad rons. The B ritish  
squadron  was composed of six vessels, including 
three schooners, while the American’s 13 vessels 
in c luded  ten  schooners. However, the  chief 
difference betw een them  w as in  the  a rm am en t 
th a t  they  carried . The A m ericans possessed  
m ore long gu n s th a t h ad  an  effective range of 
one mile. Of the  112 pieces of o rd inance  in 
Chauncey’s squadron, 66 were long guns capable 
of a combined broadside of 779 pounds of metal.
By com parison , Yeo’s b ro ad sid e  long-range 
w eight of m etal w as ju s t  162 pounds. On the 
o ther han d , a t sh o rt range w hen carronades 
en te red  the  equation , the  B ritish  b roadside
weight of m etal rose to 1,392 pounds, due to 
th e  p rep o n d e ra n ce  of th is  w eapon  in  th e ir  
arm am ent. C hauncey h ad  fewer of these short- 
range w eapons, b u t in  the end the com bined 
weight of broadside m etal w as the  sam e as the 
B ritish , 1,387 pounds. However, u n d e r  500 
yards the  B ritish  carronades, w ith their heavy 
s h o t, w ere a very  d e a d ly  w eap o n . C alled  
“sm ash e rs ,” they were easy to handle and  could 
be fired more rapidly th an  the cum bersom e long- 
range can n o n .16 But, to get in  close, the  B ritish 
h a d  to ru n  the  g au n tle t of the  A m erican long- 
range guns. To do th is  it w as best to have the 
wind advantage so as to close the d istance  as 
quickly as possible. The A m erican advantage 
c o u ld  a lso  be  n e u tr a l iz e d  by  ro u g h  s e a  
c o n d it io n s , d a rk n e s s ,  fog, r a in  o r h a z e . 
W henever these  conditions favored the British, 
C hauncey  ra n  for port. Hence he w as unwilling 
to s tray  far from Fort Niagara.
August 9 (con’t)
At 6 [pm] a breeze sprang up from 
northward. At sunset the enemy squadron 
bore S.E. by S. 6 or 7 leagues distant [21 -  
24.5 miles. This bearing and distance would 
place the American fleet in the mouth of the 
Niagara River.] At 10.30 [pm] filled [our sails]
& bore away S.S.E. [towards Niagara], 
Fresh breezes Nly., squadron in company.
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Midnight: brisk breezes Nly. Hove to on the 
starboard tack, squadron in company.
Tuesday, August 10
A.M.: Clear weather & fresh breezes of 
N.N.W. wind. At 3.30 [am] worewith the 
squadron & stood in for the land S.S.E.
w as particu la rly  tru e  in  th is  in stance , as  the 
A m ericans h ad  form ed a double line of ba ttle  
w ith the  schooners to w indw ard, screening  the 
larger vessels. The advantage of the  lee gauge 
for the  A m ericans w as th a t  they could decline 
ba ttle  by m ore readily bearing  away before the 
wind. All of these  factors were ab o u t to come 
into play.
At 4.20 [am] saw Niagara bearing E.S.E.
Bore up and stood towards it.
Could see nothing of the enemy squadron.
At 6.00 [am] Niagara 8 miles distant. 
Discovered the enemy squadron from the 
masthead to northward, standing to the 
westward. Tacked & hauled close to the 
wind on the starboard tack.
At 11.00 [am] wind died away and was 
succeeded by light variable airs.
At Noon: light breezes of westerly wind, 
squadron standing in for the land.
Enemy bearing N.N.E. 6 or 7 leagues 
distant. [This distance and bearing placed 
Chauncey in the middle of the lake while 
Yeo was in position to prevent him from 
retiring to his refuge at Niagara. There was 
no avoiding a battle now.]
P.M.: Clear warm weather. At 2.00 [pm] the 
Twelve Mile Creek [Port Dalhousie] bore 
S.E. distant 5 or 6 miles. Sent a boat on 
shore to communicate with our army. At 
4.00 [pm] calm. Observed the enemy to the 
northward with a light breeze easterly, 
standing towards us. At Sunset, a breeze 
sprung up from the S.S.W. Made sail on the 
larboard tack and stood for the enemy.
W hen the wind sprang  up  from the sou th -sou th ­
west, Yeo gained the advantage of the  w eather 
gauge, i.e. he w as w indw ard of C hauncey. For 
the  aggressor, th is  w indw ard advantage m ean t 
th a t he could control w hen and  where the battle 
should begin. Since it was after sunset, Yeo could 
use the windward advantage to quickly press into 
close range in  the  da rk  w here h is carronade 
would be m ost effective. In battle , vessels w ith 
the weather gauge are sooner clear of smoke and 
can  b e tte r  observe signals, w hereas the  enem y 
to leeward m u st endure the continuance of both 
h is own an d  h is opponen ts sm oke longer. This
At 8.00 [pm] observed him haul his wind on 
the larboard tack & make all sail, he being 
on our lee bow about 6 miles. Made all sail 
and & stood after him.
C hauncey tu rn ed  away and  sailed north -north - 
w est tow ards York with the wind on his left side. 
Yeo chased  after him.
At 10.00 [pm] wore [stern passes through 
the wind] and stood on the starboard tack 
to gain the enemy. At 10.30 tacked & stood 
after the enemy.
Using the wind to his advantage, Yeo tu rned  right 
to quickly sho rten  the d istance betw een him self 
and  the rear of the enemy colum ns while staying 
ou t of their line of fire. At 10.30 pm  he resum ed 
his parallel course, overtaking the enemy at short 
range.
At 11.00 [pm], the enemy squadron, 
consisting of two [large] ships one brig & 
eight schooners, being on our lee [right] bow 
& beam, about j  of a mile distant, 
commenced firing at us as we ranged along 
their line to close with the headmost ships. 
At 11.30 [pm] commenced firing with our 
long guns as shots now began to gaul [gall] 
us in our sails & rigging. At 12.00 [midnight], 
the enemy made sail & wore before the wind 
[turned downwind], at the same time 
observed two of his squadron to windward. 
Made all possible sail to cut them off.
The log im plies th a t  a t m idnight, w ith the 
British squadron  close in  on the windward side, 
C hauncey tu rned  away and  p u t before the wind, 
leaving beh ind  two schooners th a t  h ad  m issed  
the  signal, m ost likely in  the  confusion and  
sm oke of ba ttle . C hauncey  la te r claim ed in his 
report th a t  only the  screening  schooners were 
to wear and pass through his line of larger ships. 
He w ent on to claim  th a t w hen two schooners 
m issed the signal, he then  turned  his larger ships
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dow n wind as well, in order to draw  the  B ritish  
away from  h is w ayw ard schooners.
The esteem ed Theodore Roosevelt, one-time 
P re s id e n t of th e  U n ited  S ta te s  a n d  n o ted  
h istorian , m ade th is a ssessm en t of C hauncey’s 
actions.
It is certainly a novel principle, th a t if p a r t of a 
force is su rrounded , the true  way to rescue it is 
to ru n  away w ith the balance, in hopes th a t the 
enemy will follow. Had Chauncey tacked a t once 
[instead of wearing], Sir Jam es would have been 
placed between two fires and  it would have been 
im possible for h im  to cap tu re  th e  schooners.
As it w as, th e  B ritish  co m m an d e r hav ing  
attacked  a superior force in  w eather th a t suited  
it, cap tu red  two of its vessels w ithout suffering 
any injury beyond a  few sho t holes in  the sa ils.17
A fter th re e  d a y s  of in d e c is iv e  a c tio n , 
Chauncey’s excuses were beginning to wear thin. 
He h a d  a lot of explaining to do for h is  depleted 
num bers and failed aspirations. He chose to sum  
up  his version of these events by weakly claiming 
th a t  the  B ritish  com m ander h a d  been  lucky so 
far, and  despite the inferiority of h is [own] force, 
he felt confident of success.
These sen tim en ts  were n o t shared  by m any 
of the crew of the Am erican squadron . A copy of 
a portion  of one of the A m erican logbooks w as 
le a k e d  to  th e  U n ite d  S t a te s  G a z e tte ,  
anonym ously. It included a critical analysis of 
the hand ling  of the General Pike on the  n ight of 
10 August. “Every gun was pointed, every m atch 
ready in  h a n d ,” w rote the d isg run tled  officer, 
“w h e n  to  o u r  u t t e r  a s to n i s h m e n t ,  th e  
Commodore wore and  stood so u th  east, leaving 
S ir  J a m e s  to  ex u lt in  th e  c a p tu re  of two 
schooners.”18
A n o th e r  in d iv id u a l ,  a n  a n o n y m o u s  
m id s h ip m a n , w ro te  a le t te r  to  h is  u n c le  
criticizing the Am erican leadership during 7-10 
A ugust. This le tte r eventually  m ade its way to 
the desk of the Secretary of the Navy. This young 
w itn e s s  o b se rv e d  th a t  on  7 A u g u s t, th e  
com m odore fired five or six  gu n s w hich the 
B ritish  did n o t re tu rn  b u t con tinued  bearing  
down on us. The commodore, th u n d ers tru ck  a t 
the ir coolness an d  determ ined  bravery, tacked  
sh ip  a n d  left th em  u n d e r  th e  p re te n s e  of 
endeavouring  to get the  w eather gauge. This 
w riter also claimed th a t the loss of the Hamilton
A Novel Principle of Naval Warfare
Chauncey was out-maneuvered at every meeting during the first encounter with his more experienced Royal Navy 
counterpart on Lake Ontario. There was no better example of this than at midnight on 10 August 1913 when he withdrew 
his ships from the action on the pretense of attempted to draw the enemy away from the cut-off element of his squadron.
an d  Scourge  w as due to passive  tac tic s  for 
w hich  th e  com m odore w as answ erab le  an d  
p erhaps highly censurable . On 10 A ugust, th is 
a s tu te  ju n io r officer noted th a t “We kep t closing 
u n til two of ou r schooners were in  the  m idst of 
the enem y’s fleet w hen the  com m odore wore 
sh ip  an d  left the  enem y.” He fu rth e r implied 
th a t  the  abandoned  vessels a t least fought like 
h e ro es ,19 even if they did not.
E ven  C h a u n c e y ’s se co n d -in -c o m m a n d , 
C aptain A rthur Sinclair, cap ta in  of the flagship, 
General Pike, a lthough generally full of bravado 
for the Am erican squad ron ’s capabilities, gave a
possession of two of the enemy’s squadron. 
They proved to be Julia mounting one long 
32 pound gun & a long 12 pounder, a crew 
of 38 men & a commander and the Growler 
mounting a long 32 pounder & two 6 
pounders and 39 men. At daylight the high 
land of York bore North about 8 miles 
distant. The enemy squadron bore S.S.E. 
just perceivable, [towards the direction of 
Niagara] The squadron and prizes in 
company turning to windward to make York.
At Noon cleared Gibraltar Point, fresh 
breezes westerly. Departed this life,
Night Encounter 10 August 1813
The balance of naval power on Lake Ontario swung 
in favour of the British on 10 August 1813, when 
Commodore Chauncey lost four ships in two days: 
the USS Hamilton & Scourge in a squall and the USS 
Growler & Julia, shown here (in foreground). 
Chauncey lost his nerve in this night action and 
abandoned his wayward schooners.
h in t of criticism  ab o u t h is com m ander in  a 
le tte r to a friend. “I never p itied a m an  m ore in 
my life th an  I do him . He is a brave en terprising  
m an  b u t h a s  h a d  ra th e r  too h igh an  opinion of 
th o se  con founded  g u n b o a ts ” [sc h o o n e rs l.20 
S in c la i r  fe lt t h a t  th e  s c h o o n e r s  w ere  a 
de trim en t to the  sq u ad ro n  an d  th a t  the  w orst 
of them  shou ld  be converted to tran sp o rts .
In a report to Governor Prevost, w ritten  off 
York the day after the  action  of 10 A ugust, Yeo 
m ade th is assessm en t of Chauncey.
.. .by w atching every opportunity, we should  get 
the better of him, b u t as long as he is determined 
to sacrifice everything to h is  own safety, I shall 
never b ring  h is  two [larger] sh ip s  to action. In 
th is  conduct he canno t long persevere for h is 
own honour. The loss of h is  schooners will be 
an  indelible disgrace, and  I am  a t a  loss to know 
how he will accoun t to h is governm ent for it.21
Wednesday, August 11
A.M. Clear weather & fresh breezes of 
W.N.W. wind. At 12.30 [am], took
Thomas Wall seaman. P.M. same weather. 
At 1.00 [pm] came to an anchor off York in 
10 fathoms water, the light house bearing 
E. by S. Employed cleaning ship, sending 
prisoners ashore. At the same time, the 
Master sent ashore to procure supplies of 
beef for the squadron & a bowsprit & boom 
for the prizes, they being lost in the action. 
Joined the ship as a supernumerary, Mr. 
Reid, gunner.
As s ta ted  earlier, Yeo took th is  tim e to write h is 
action  report. He recorded the cap tu re  of the 
Julia  an d  Growler s ta tin g  th a t  in  th is  action as 
he cam e u p  with the A m erican sh ip s  they  “p u t 
before the wind and  m ade sail, firing their s te rn  
chase g u n s .. .1 therefore m ade sail betw een them  
and  the two schooners to w indw ard,.. .capturing 
the  Ju lia  an d  Growler.” He found ou t from  the 
A m erican p risoners th a t  the  Hamilton an d  the 
Scourge, “two of his largest schooners h ad  upset 
the n ight before las t [the m orning  of 8 August] 
in carrying [too m uch] sail to keep from u s  and  
all on board  p e rish ed .” He also reported , “It
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c o n c e rn s  m e to fin d  I hav e  s u c h  a  w ary  
o p p o n e n t, a s  it h a r a s s e s  m e b e y o n d  m y 
s tren g th . I am  very unw ell an d ...I  have no t
closed my eyes for the  la s t forty-eight h o u rs .”
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In 1809, Yeo h ad  con tracted  tropical fever 
in  F rench  G uiana. After being confined to bed 
for two m onths, he w as se n t hom e to recover 
b u t he continued to have recurring bouts of fever. 
On 21 A ugust 1818 the fever h a d  so debilitated 
him  th a t he died on passage home from Jam aica. 
B ecause of h is p rem atu re  death , Sir Jam e s  Yeo 
did not write h is m em oirs. This gave C hauncey 
free re in  to provide h is version of the  naval 
actions on Lake O ntario  and  o u r h isto ry  h a s  
carried  th a t  b ias for the la s t 180 years.
C onclusion
Now w ith th e  record  provided by the  log of HMS Wolfe, we have  a m ore b a la n c e d  
version of the first encounter between the British 
and  A m erican naval forces on Lake O ntario. As 
we m ight have expected, the feted and  seasoned 
B ritish  v e te ran , C om m odore Yeo, fo u n d  it 
d iff ic u lt to  b r in g  h is  o p p o n e n t, th e  w ary  
A m erican sh ip y ard  adm in is tra to r, to ba ttle . 
N either com m ander w as p repared  to m ake a 
reckless gam ble for the control of Lake O ntario 
w hen the stakes were so high. It was Chauncey’s 
sense  of inferiority th a t  caused  him  to cling to 
h is cum bersom e schooners for an  advantage in 
n u m b ers  an d  firepower. However, they sim ply 
m ade h is squadron  unm anageable  as a fighting 
u n it an d  caused  him  to s tay  close to h is escape 
ha tch , the Niagara River and  its fortifications. It 
w as Yeo who sailed  in to  open w ater an d  m ade 
the  aggressive moves to cause  a  showdown. 
U nfortunately he h as  never been given credit for 
h is superio r seam an sh ip  b ecause  w ithou t the 
log  of HM S W olfe, few  h i s to r ia n s  r e a lly  
u nders tood  his actions. C onsequently , he h as  
been painted  with the sam e b ru sh  as Chauncey.
B ecause there w as no Trafalgar-like victory 
on Lake Ontario as with Perry on Lake Erie, both 
Yeo and Chauncey have been accused of dancing 
around the lake while carrying out a shipbuilding 
race. In light of the inform ation p resen ted  here, 
su ch  views are an  oversim plification of fact and  
to tally  u n fa ir to the o u ts tan d in g  rep u ta tio n  of 
Com m odore Yeo an d  h is B ritish  S quad ron  on 
Lake O ntario.
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